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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44757
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2015-17519
v. )
)
SARAH KATHLEEN PEARCE, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Sarah Pearce contends the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction
in this case.  The rider staff had recommended probation, and, based on that recommendation,
another judge had suspended Ms. Pearce’s sentences in another case.  However, the district court
in this case, unlike its counterpart, did not sufficiently consider all the information showing
Ms. Pearce’s progress toward rehabilitation, and thus, her potential to be successful on probation.
As a result, its decision to relinquish jurisdiction constituted an abuse of its discretion.
Therefore, this Court should remand this case for an order placing Ms. Pearce on probation.
2Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In this case, Ms. Pearce pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, and the State
agreed to dismiss other charges and to limit its sentencing recommendation to a unified term of
seven years, with three years fixed.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.5, L.19 - p.6, L.15.)1  At the time, Ms. Pearce
was 33 years old and had spent thirteen years in prison before she was suddenly released
pursuant to an agreement to post-conviction relief in another case.2  (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.12,
L.22 - p.13, L.14; Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.72, 83.)  As defense
counsel explained, she went from “the context of structure and accountability [in prison] to
suddenly being released.  And that’s a lot for Ms. Pearce -- it proved, I think to be a lot for her to
swallow.”  (Tr., Vol.2, p.13, Ls.6-12.)  Ms. Pearce added that she had overestimated her ability
to cope with external stressors during her period of release, and so, had turned to drugs, which
she was using particularly to self-medicate her symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.  (PSI,
p.76.)   Basically,  as  she  succinctly  summarized,  “I  didn’t  know  how  to  be  free.”   (Tr.,  Vol.2,
p.16, Ls.23-24.)
Her probation officer recognized this issue as well, attributing Ms. Pearce’s struggles to
seek help from and participate in mental health or substance abuse treatment programs to her
distrust in the criminal justice system caused by her experiences in the other case.  (PSI, p.84.)
However, as defense counsel pointed out, not all of her struggles to access appropriate programs
1 The transcripts are provided in three separately bound and paginated volumes.  To avoid
confusion, “Vol.1” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the entry of plea hearing
held on February 24, 2016.  “Vol.2” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the
sentencing hearing, held on May 11, 2016, and “Vol.3” will refer to the volume containing the
transcript of the rider review hearing held on December 7, 2016.
2 Ms. Pearce was placed on probation in that other case, and probation violation proceedings
were occurring at the same time as the proceedings in this case.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.8, Ls.1-16.)
However, that other case is not on appeal here.
3were necessarily her fault, as the parties were operating under the belief that one such program –
drug court – was foreclosed to Ms. Pearce due to the exercise of a statutory prosecutorial veto.3
(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.15, Ls.11-15.)  Ultimately, Ms. Pearce’s probation officer stated, though
with some reservations, that Ms. Pearce would benefit from participating in an intensive
treatment program, such as the rider program.  (PSI, pp.84-85.)
At the sentencing hearing in this case, defense counsel also recommended the district
court retain jurisdiction (like its counterpart had in the other case) so as to allow Ms. Pearce the
opportunity to actually participate in rehabilitative programming.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.15, L.25 - p.16,
L.17.)  The district court agreed, retaining jurisdiction and imposing an underlying sentence of
seven years, with three years fixed.  (Tr., Vol.2 p.18, Ls.7-24.)
The rider staff recommended probation.  (PSI, pp.135, 141.)  The other district court
ordered probation.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.6, Ls.1-2.)  And yet, the district court in this case refused to do
so.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.16, Ls.5-6.)
The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction in this case was based primarily on
its evaluation of Ms. Pearce’s behavior during the rider program.  (See Tr., Vol.3, p.14,
L.14 - p.16, L.4.)  True, she did receive a formal disciplinary sanction and several informal
sanctions during the course of her rider program, but the rider staff explained there was more to
her case than simply the fact that she had incurred those sanctions:  “Though Ms. Pearce did
3 Ms. Pearce was released onto probation on March 14, 2014.  (See PSI, p.84.)  Two weeks later,
in a case involving a mental health court program, the Idaho Supreme Court held that this sort of
“post-judgment prosecutorial veto violates the Separation of Powers doctrine.” State v. Easley,
156 Idaho 214, 221 (2014).  Ultimately though, while that veto in the other case was likely
unconstitutional, in the case at bar, defense counsel explained that, because the State was
responsible for narrowing the options available to Ms. Pearce, its argument – that her struggles in
accessing treatment programs in the other case meant there was no option but to execute her
sentence in this case – was somewhat disingenuous.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.15, Ls.7-24.)
4struggle with following institutional rules and had a number of written/verbal warnings and one
infraction, I am recommending probation based on the effort and work she put into
programming.”  (PSI, p.141.)  Specifically, Ms. Pearce “really seems to want to work on a life of
sobriety,” evidenced, for example, by her efforts to develop a support network in the community
and secure employment upon release.  (PSI, p.141.)  In fact, Ms. Pearce was able to complete all
the programs she was assigned during the rider program.  (PSI, p.136.)  She had also been
stabilized  on  a  mental  health  medication  regimen  during  her  time  in  the  rider  program.   (PSI,
p.141.)  “All of these things speak in her favor and will increase her chances of success on
probation.”  (PSI, p.141.)
Although it decided to relinquish jurisdiction, the district court did, on its own motion,
alter Ms. Pearce’s sentence so that it would be for a unified term of seven years, with only one
and one-half years fixed, with the intent that she would serve approximately nine months before
being parole-eligible.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.16, Ls.5-16.)  Ms. Pearce filed a notice of appeal timely
from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp.68, 73.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over Ms. Pearce.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over Ms. Pearce
The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001); State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430,
438 (Ct. App. 2011); see also State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (articulating the
standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion).  “The purpose of
5retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court additional time for
evaluation of the defendant’s rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation.” State v. Lee,
117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990).  In deciding whether to suspend a sentence after a period of
retained jurisdiction, the district court “considers all of the circumstances to assess the
defendant’s ability to succeed in a less structured environment and to determine the course of
action that will further the purposes of rehabilitation, protection of society, deterrence, and
retribution.” Statton, 136 Idaho at 137.  In this regard, the protection of society is the primary
objective the court should consider. See, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also indicated that rehabilitation is the first means the
district court should consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240
(1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
In this case, the information presented in the rider staff’s report shows that, even though
Ms. Pearce did not have a perfect rider, she showed an improved ability to succeed in the less-
structured environment of probation, such that suspending her sentence would best serve the
goals of sentencing.  For example, she completed all her assigned programs.  (PSI, p.136.)
In doing so, she showed a desire to “work on a life of sobriety,” and had been developing a
support network in the community and had secured employment upon release.  (PSI, p.141.)  The
tools provided by those classes and the support network in the community, which she did not
have during her first period of probation, specifically address one of the issues which led to this
case – Ms. Pearce’s overestimation of her ability to suddenly adjust to life outside prison after
her 13-year term of incarceration.  A sufficient consideration of all these factors leads to the
same  conclusion  the  rider  staff  reached  –  that  despite  the  struggles  with  the  rules  in  the  rider
6program, Ms. Pearce’s efforts and growth in that program shows her ability to be successful on
probation.  (See PSI, p.141.)
Furthermore, while in the rider program, Ms. Pearce stabilized her mental health
medication regimen.  (See PSI,  p.141.)   This  is  important  not  just  because  the  side  effects  of
adjusting to a medication regimen can negatively impact a person’s behavior, but also because
the resulting stability of her medication regimen specifically addressed another of the issues
which led to this case – she was using drugs to self-medicate symptoms of her post-traumatic
stress disorder.  (See PSI, p.76; compare PSI, p.128 (2003 psychological examination providing
no mental health diagnoses due to the fact that Ms. Pearce was not reporting symptoms of such a
condition); with PSI, p.101 (2015 GAIN-I evaluation specifically diagnosing Ms. Pearce with a
mood disorder and a generalized anxiety disorder, and giving rule-out diagnoses for (i.e., stating
it was likely she suffered from) PTSD and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder as well).)
Thus, the fact that she had a stabilized medication regimen means Ms. Pearce’s mental
health issues, which were not sufficiently addressed during the period of probation, were now
under control, and so, she was more likely to be successful on probation this time around. See
I.C. § 19-2523 (requiring the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s mental health issues
when making sentencing decisions).  It is also noteworthy that Ms. Pearce was able to recognize
and identify her mental health issues for what they were even before the rider program started.
(See PSI, p.76.)  Thus, she was able to work specifically on those issues during the rider
program, and so, further increase her ability to be successful on an ensuing period of probation.
(See PSI, p.141 (rider staff “recommending probation based on the effort and work she put into
programming”).)
7A sufficient consideration of all this information, as recognized by the district court in the
other case, shows that probation was the appropriate result for Ms. Pearce.  (See Tr., Vol.3, p.6,
Ls.1-2.)   The  district  court  in  this  case,  however,  focused  only  on  the  negative  aspects  of  the
rider staff’s report, and that reveals the abuse of its discretion.  (See Tr., Vol.3, p.14, L.14 - p.16,
L.4.)
Furthermore, the decision to reduce Ms. Pearce’s sentence in this case is an insufficient
substitution for probation as those options relate to the goals of sentencing because the district
court’s decision delays Ms. Pearce’s access to rehabilitative programs. Cf. Cook v. State, 145
Idaho 482, 488-89 (Ct. App. 2008) (indicating that the timeliness of the rehabilitation
opportunities is a factor which should be considered); see also McCoy, 94 Idaho at 240
(indicating  that  rehabilitation  should  be  the  first  means  considered  to  forward  the  goal  of
protecting society).  That fact is particularly problematic in Ms. Pearce’s case, where part of the
issue during the last period of probation was the fact that State had (likely unconstitutionally) cut
off Ms. Pearce’s access to potential rehabilitative opportunities.  (See Tr., Vol.2, p.15, Ls.11-15
(noting the parties believed drug court was foreclosed to Ms. Pearce due to a post-judgment
prosecutorial veto); see also PSI, p.84 (Ms. Pearce’s probation officer noting that this same sort
of issue contributed to Ms. Pearce’s struggles to effectively rehabilitate because of the mistrust in
the  system  those  failures  have  engendered).)   Besides,  even  when  Ms.  Pearce  becomes  parole
eligible,  that  does  not  mean  the  Department  of  Correction  has  to  grant  her  release. See, e.g.,
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005).  Rather, it could simply require her to serve out her
whole sentence.  That scenario is similar to the scenario which played out when Ms. Pearce was
released following her 13-year term of incarceration – it would be abrupt with little ongoing
8support  in  place.   As  a  result,  the  sentencing  alternative  the  district  court  chose  provides  less
protection for society in the long run than suspending her sentence at the end of the rider.
Since  the  district  court  did  not  give  sufficient  consideration  to  the  progress  Ms.  Pearce
actually made in the rider program, and so, failed to sufficiently consider the totality of
Ms. Pearce’s situation, her character, and her ability to be successful on probation, the district
court in this case abused its discretion in this case by deciding to relinquish jurisdiction over
Ms. Pearce.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Pearce respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction
and remand this case for an order placing her on probation.
DATED this 11th day of July, 2017.
_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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